




Abstract— A genetic algorithm has been developed to solve 
bidding strategies in a dynamic multi-unit auction: the Ausubel 
auction, with independent private values and without dropout 
information. The genetic algorithm aims to maximize each 
bidder’s payoff. To this end two experimental environments 
have been tested with decreasing and increasing marginal 
utilities. The bidding strategies are analyzed, along with their 
effects on revenue and efficiency. With decreasing marginal 
utilities the computational experiments yield to sincere bidding 
as the evolutionary-stable strategy, which is also the weakly 
dominant strategy and the ex post perfect equilibrium. 
Nevertheless, with increasing marginal utilities there is no 
theory model developed in order to find the equilibrium. 
Therefore, the challenge of this work is to study the auction 
outcome where theoretical predictions are unknown. The 
genetic algorithm finds bidding sincerely as the evolutionary-
stable strategy with increasing marginal utilities. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ULTI-UNIT auctions are widely used in different 
markets for selling items like spectrum rights, treasury 
bills, electricity, emission permits, etc. In multiple-object 
environments where individual bidders may demand more 
than one homogeneous item, the seller must choose among a 
wide variety of auction formats. The most common multi-
unit auctions with sealed-bid formats are the discriminatory 
auction, the uniform-price auction and the Vickrey auction. 
On the other hand, in the open format the underlying 
auctions are the Dutch (or open descending price) auction, 
the English (or open ascending-price) auction and the 
Ausubel auction (a dynamic version of the Vickrey auction).  
Auction theory is founded on the dual assumptions of 
rational behavior and equilibrium. It gives players some 
prescriptive guidance of how they should play. 
Nevertheless, a number of social scientists challenge the 
rationality assumption, and argue that it should not be taken 
for granted. Therefore, an alternative must be reached in 
order to search for the best strategies but without assuming 
perfectly calculating rationality on players. Biological theory 
of evolution might be a key point to this challenge. 
Biological theory rests upon three fundamentals: 
heterogeneity, fitness and selection. An important part of 
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animals´ behaviour is genetically determined by one or more 
genes (genotype) that govern a particular pattern of 
behaviour (phenotype or strategy). The pool of genes 
ensures heterogeneity of phenotypes in the population, for 
which success is given by a quantitative measure called 
fitness value. The fitness of a particular strategy is defined 
as its aggregate or average payoff in its matching with all the 
strategies in the population. The process of selection ensures 
that the fitter phenotypes become relatively more numerous 
in the next generation, and may be leads, eventually, to a 
stable state. Changes produce new genetic mutations that 
can guide to a new and fitter phenotype and successfully 
invade a population, i.e., spreading till became a significant 
proportion of the population. A particular phenotype is 
evolutionary stable if any mutant cannot invade its 
population successfully. Therefore, the strategy played by an 
evolutionary stable phenotype is called an evolutionary-
stable strategy (ESS), the strategy that will persist in the 
population if played by all the existing phenotypes, see [1]. 
A recent method of analyzing strategies on auctions using 
evolutionary games is by the means of systems of artificial 
adaptive agents (AAA). The analysis of these systems gives 
new approaches to the understanding of the economic and 
social behaviour of auctions. In this way, the use of machine 
learning systems can help in the finding of optimal strategies 
or in the evaluation, from different points of view, of the 
auction itself with respect to other possible auctions. In this 
context, genetic algorithms (GAs) are a good learning 
method. GAs were developed by Holland [2] as a robust 
method of adaptive searching, learning and optimization in 
complex problem domains. This method has been applied 
for describing the learning behavior of agents in auctions:  
[3]-[10], etc.  
This paper is focused on a particular specification of a 
multiple-object ascending-clock auction developed by [11], 
[12], which is usually known as the Ausubel auction. In this 
auction, with private values and diminishing marginal 
utilities, sincere bidding by all bidders is an ex post perfect 
equilibrium, yielding to efficient outcome. Nevertheless, 
with increasing marginal utilities the theoretical equilibrium 
has not been developed yet.  
The aim of this work is to use GAs to study the bidders´ 
behaviour searching for the strategy that maximize their 
payoff, for both, increasing and decreasing marginal 
utilities. The challenge is to find out whether the best 
strategies can be achieved automatically by means of GAs. 
Evolutionary-stable strategies with increasing and decreasing 
marginal utilities in the Ausubel auction  
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Furthermore, the auction is analysed in terms of revenue and 
efficiency that yields.  
There are other authors that have studied this auction 
format, [13]-[14], and made a modification of the Ausubel 
auction with asymmetric bidders and interdependent values. 
This modification was made in order to get an efficient 
ascending multiple auction. Bikhchandani [15] showed that 
the auction corresponds to the implementation of a marginal 
product pricing equilibrium via the primal-dual algorithm. 
Additionally, this auction format has been frequently 
compared with other multi-unit auctions. [16] compared this 
auction experimentally with the static multi-unit auction 
analysed by [17] both for private and common value. [18], 
[19] studied these two auction mechanisms and also 
included the alternative of with and without dropout 
information in the Ausubel format. [20] considered four 
different auction formats: sealed-bid Vickrey auction, 
Ausubel auction with dropout information provided, 
survival auction and two-stage survival auction. They 
conducted an experimental study to compare the different 
outcomes. [21] evaluated pros and cons of the standard 
ascending-clock auction and the Ausubel auction in a setting 
where the authorities wished to allocate exclusive rights 
such as emission permits efficiently, and where allocation of 
these rights has consequences for the level of production as 
well as market shares. [22] presented a laboratory 
experiment of different multi-unit auction mechanisms. 
These authors tested whether expected demand reduction 
occurs in open and sealed-bid uniform-price auctions. 
Moreover, they analysed the revenue equivalence for these 
auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the 
discriminatory sealed-bid auction. 
The remainder of this article is structured in the following 
manner. Section 2 presents good reasons for relaxing the 
decreasing marginal utilities assumption and consider that 
bidders can have increasing marginal utilities. A definition 
of the auction model is given in section 3. Section 4 
describes the experimental environment, the bidding strategy 
for each environment and the fundamentals of the bidding 
algorithm. Section 5 evaluates the experimental results for 
both increasing and decreasing marginal utilities by studying 
the bidders´ strategy, revenues and efficiency. Finally, in 
section 6 the main conclusions and future work are 
presented. 
II. WHY INCREASING MARGINAL UTILITIES? 
Traditional utility theory assumes that people are rational 
agents with diminishing marginal utilities. This involves 
that, as additional units of a good are consumed, they report 
a lower marginal utility, the economic “law of diminishing 
marginal utility”. These models also presume that tastes are 
stable overtime and among people. Nevertheless, these 
theories do not enclose the whole amalgam of possibilities 
for the consumers´ utilities. They do not allow time to 
change the consumers´ tastes. Hence, explanations for 
economics behaviour (including changes in their characters) 
can not be reached.  
Reference [23] presented an alternative theory of 
consumer choice explained by using a generalized calculus 
of utility-maximizing behaviour without assuming that tastes 
remain stable. These authors take categories of behaviour 
commonly held to demonstrate changes in tastes or to be 
explicable only in terms of such changes, and show that they 
are reconcilable with their assumption of stable preferences. 
Frequently tastes change with time. However, people can 
be “addicted” to certain goods such as caffeine, cigarettes, 
alcohol or drugs, of which consumption over a significant 
amount of time often increase the craving of consuming 
more. There are also certain goods that require training or 
education, such as books, music or even a relation ship, of 
wich consumption over time has the same effect. The 
explanation for these attitudes in economic terms is that 
people have increasing marginal utilities over time because 
taste change on their favor. [23] define the term 
“consumption capital” as the consumption accumulation by 
the consumer, which can be “beneficial” addiction like 
reading or “harmful” addiction like having drugs. 
Later on, economist accepted the possibility that, in some 
cases, preferences functions will demonstrate increasing 
returns to scale, [24]. If an individual consumes or acquires 
more of a good, and the marginal utility of additional 
amounts of that good increases, then, the individual’s 
preferences reveal increasing return to scale. Individual 
preferences may reflect increasing returns to scale when 
increasing amounts can change the use of the good or 
resource. For example, having more tickets for going to a 
concert will probably have diminishing marginal utility if 
the consumer can only use them to go to the same concert 
over and over again. Nevertheless, these individual can have 
increasing marginal utility if having one ticket means 
listening to the concert, two means having a date, three 
means having a party, and so on. 
According to prospect theory [25], the same level of 
wealth can imply poverty or riches for different persons, 
depending on their initial assets. Therefore, value should be 
treated as a function in two arguments, measured as changes 
(positive or negative) from a reference point. The reference 
points create perceived regions of gain and loss that take on 
non-linear preference functions. An important characteristic 
of attitudes to changes in welfare is that, the annoyance that 
one experience in losing a sum of money appears to be 
greater than the pleasure associated with gaining the same 
amount. Thus, these authors propose a value function, which 
is defined on deviations from the reference point; generally 
concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and steeper 
for losses than for gains. With this utility function [26] 
showed how this preference function is likely to reflect 
increasing marginal utility, and decreasing marginal utility. 
Moreover, theses authors studied the effect of non-linear 
preferences on negotiated settlements. They tested whether 
the shape of negotiators´ preferences influenced the 
negotiated outcomes. The shape of the preferences analysed 
was: linear, increasing and decreasing marginal utility. 
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Results supported a strong main effect for negotiators´ 
preferences on the outcomes. To sum up, increasing 
marginal utilities do exist in real life. Therefore, to analyze 
the effect of these preferences in the outcome of an auction 
can be helpful. 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE AUSUBEL AUCTION MECHANISM  
This paper focuses on a particular specification of rules 
for what might be referred to generically as an “ascending-
clock auction”. The alternative ascending-bid auction or 
Ausubel auction was developed by Ausubel [11], [12]. The 
auction starts with a low price, with price increasing 
continuously in each round (l). Bidders start out actively 
bidding on all units demanded, choosing what price to drop 
out of the bidding, with dropping out being irrevocable. 
Winning bidders pay the price at which they have “clinched” 
an item and the process repeats until all units are allocated. 
For a better understanding of the allocation and payment 
rule of this mechanism, Table 1 includes an example of this 
auction with four identical objects to sell, m = 4. There are 
three bidders, n =3, and their diminishing marginal values 
are given as follows: Bidder A: vA,1 = 40, vA,2 = 35,  vA,3 = 
30, vA,4 = 20; Bidder B: vB,1 = 40, vB,2 = 20,  vB,3 = 15, vB,4 = 
10; Bidder C: vC,1 = 25, vC,2 = 15,  vC,3 = 10, vC,4 = 5. These 
are marginal values for a first, second, third and fourth item, 
respectively. 
TABLE 1 
EXAMPLE OF AN AUSUBEL AUCTION PROCESS WITH DECREASING 
MARGINAL UTILITIES 
Price 







Clinching of items 
 A B C   
0 4 4 4 12  
5 4 4 3 11  
10 4 3 2 9  
15 4 2 1 7 A “clinches” an item 
20 3 1 1 5 A “clinches” an item 
25 3 1 0 4 A & B “clinches” an item 
 
This example assumes that each bidder is going to bid 
according to his real values, sincere bidding. This means that 
bidders demand positive quantities as long as their values 
are lower than the standing price. Furthermore, demand is 
required to be non-increasing with price. At the initial price, 
p1=0, the aggregate demand is Q1=12, which is bigger than 
the available supply, m=4, so the auction must proceed 
further. The auctioneer begins to continuously increment the 
clock and price, and bidders submit their demands. The first 
important change occurs when the price reaches 15. The 
aggregate demand at this price is 7 and the supply is 4. 
Bidder A has now mathematically guaranteed himself at 
least one object as the aggregate demand of all competitors 
other than bidder A has dropped to 3. Bidder A has clinched 
winning an object for which he will pay 15 monetary units. 
The auction carries on and, as price goes up, bidders 
continue submitting their non-increasing demands. The 
auction ends when the price attains a level of 25 and bidder 
C drops out of the auction reducing the aggregate demand to 
just 4, thus equating demand with supply. With this last 
round the final outcome of the auction is that bidder A wins 
three objects for 15, 20 and 25 each and bidder B wins an 
object for 25.  
Each bidder’s payoff is defined as the difference of his 
values of the units clinched minus the price paid per each 
item, i.e. the price at which they clinched. The revenue of 
the auction is defined as the total payment of each bidder for 
the units clinched. The payoff and revenues for the previous 
example are calculated below. 
Payoff A = (40-15) + (35-20) + (30-25) = 45 
Payoff B = (40-25) = 15 
Payoff C = 0 
Revenues = 15+20+25+25= 85 
As price goes up and demanded quantities go down, it is 
possible that, for a certain increase of price, the supply is not 
covered at the final price. In these circumstances a rationing 
rule is applied. In this paper the proportional rationing rule 
has been considered. 
In this auction format with pure private values and 
diminishing marginal utilities, Ausubel [12] states that 
sincere bidding is an ex post perfect equilibrium. Moreover, 
with no bid information sincere bidding is a weakly 
dominant strategy, i. e. it is the best strategy for a player no 
matter how that player's opponents may bid. However there 
is no theory model developed for increasing marginal 
utilities, so the equilibrium is unknown.    
IV. THE GA THAT MAXIMIZE THE BIDDERS´ PAYOFF  
A GA is a search algorithm based on the mechanics of 
natural selection and natural genetics. It is an iterative 
procedure which maintains a population of structures that 
represent candidate solutions for specific domain challenges. 
During each generation, the structures in the current 
population are rated for their effectiveness as solutions, and 
on the basis of these evaluations, a new population of 
candidate structures is formed using specific “genetic 
operators” such as reproduction, crossover, and mutation. 
Crossover and mutation are simple mechanisms for agents to 
modify their existing strategies, based on past experience. 
Crossover allows an individual to create a new strategy, by 
borrowing parts of previously successful strategies. 
Mutation allows an individual to make small modifications 
in old strategies, in hopes of finding something better. 
In this work, all bidders bid according to the GA against 
their computer rivals learning from one auction to another. 
Players who fared well in the previous round will transmit 
the information to the other participants playing in the next 
round, those who fared poorly in the last round will observe 
which bidding strategies succeeded better and develop 
alternatives based on them. This task involves to the 
evolutionary dynamics of the model. Evolutionary dynamics 
can be imposed on the space of strategies by viewing 
strategies as interacting individuals in a population. These 
2581




interactions represent the actions and reactions of the 
bidders in an auction. Through these interactions, each 
individual receives a score that represents its payoffs in the 
auction. The population dynamics is introduced in the model 
by letting successful strategies to have more offspring in 
next generations. In this schema those variations are 
generated by means of modifying the offspring by 
mutations, and generating new individuals-strategies by 
crossover. Here, like in many aspects of game theory, there 
is not a goal for the system to operate. All the individuals 
have their own goal: to have the greatest payoff. This 
approach could be claimed to be near the reality, where a set 
of bidders tries to optimize theirs payoffs. The final results 
could be understood as some equilibrium states, which any 
strategy could not beat in the same conditions. The study of 
that equilibrium is very interesting from two different points 
of view: 
 -- From the point of view of the bidders: to know which  
is the best strategy, and to have information of the risk of 
playing different alternatives. 
 -- From the point of view of the auctioneer: to know 
whether the rules used to sell theirs good are appropriate in 
terms of revenues and efficiency.  
This work tries to analyse the Ausubel auction, when both 
decreasing and increasing marginal utilities are used. It also 
analyses what kind of strategies could be observed for each 
preferences, and if the equilibria could be founded. 
A. The experimental environments: decreasing and 
increasing marginal utilities 
Experiments have been designed with fifteen lots 
auctioned and four bidders with weakly diminishing 
marginal values and weakly increasing marginal values, risk 
neutral and no budget constraints (all variables are 
considered discrete). The bidders´ behavior is explored 
without dropout information; bidders have no bid 
information, so they only know if the auction is still open.  
All bidders have independent-private-values (IPV) that 
are privately observed by the respective bidders, making this 
an incomplete information game. For the diminishing 
marginal utilities, every bidder has a set of values organized 
from higher to lower which specifies the marginal value 
from the consumption of each additional unit. Bidders’ 
values are drawn independently and identically distributed 
from a uniform distribution with support [0, 200], with new 
random draws for each additional unit. These values are 
generated with the algorithm suggested by [10].  
For the experiments with increasing marginal utilities, 
every bidder has a set of values organized from lower to 
higher that specify the marginal value from the consumption 
of each additional unit. Nevertheless, it is possible that the 
bidder reaches a certain number of items that satisfies his 
demand and so, he has a zero value for the remaining units. 
An example of these preferences distribution is presented 
below. 
Bidder i:  
vi,m = (2, 6, 10, 15, 17, 20, 25, 27, 30, 40, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) 
Bidders’ values are also drawn independently and 
identically distributed from a uniform distribution with 
support [0, 10000] with new random draws for each 
additional unit. The experiments with increasing marginal 
utilities have been successfully tested with support [0, 200] 
and extended to [0, 10000] in order to add more variability 
to the test framework. The latest results are presented in the 
next section.  
B. Bidding strategy 
In each auction all bidders use a strategy codified in the 
chromosome of the individual that represents that bidder. 
The definition of the GA strategy suggested requires the 
identification of actions. Each action is defined in terms of 
deviations (over and underbidding) from the sincere bidding 
strategy. The demanded quantity according to the sincere 
bidding strategy of bidder i in the round l is represented by 
l
SBiq . The bidders have thirteen possible actions to consider 
that are represented in Table 2. All these strategies have an 
upper bound that is the lowest of either the number of units 
being auctioned or, alternatively, the units demanded in the 
previous round (as demand is required to be non increasing). 
The lower bound is the number of units that the participant 
has already clinched. It is possible that some strategies lead 











SBiq =1, then 
the strategy is: 
 
0 l
SBiq /4 0.25 Underbidding 
1 l
SBiq /3 0.33 Underbidding 
2 l
SBiq /2 0.50 Underbidding 
3 l
SBiq /1.75 0.57 Underbidding 
4 l
SBiq /1.5 0.67 Underbidding 
5 l
SBiq /1.25 0.80 Underbidding 
6 l
SBiq  1.00 Bidding sincerely 
7 l
SBiq *1.25 1.25 Overbidding 
8 l
SBiq *1.5 1.50 Overbidding 
9 l
SBiq *1.75 1.75 Overbidding 
10 l
SBiq *2 2.00 Overbidding 
11 l
SBiq *3 3.00 Overbidding 
12 l
SBiq *4 4.00 Overbidding 
C. The genetic algorithm mechanism 
The objective function that the GA tries to maximize is 
the payoff of each bidder. To this end, encoding the bidding 
strategies for the first experimental framework is a direct 
process. The thirteen possible actions can be encoded with 
four bits, (including the sincere bidding strategy, l
SBiq ).  The 
assessment of the GA is made by running 10,000 auctions 
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per experiment. The utility curves are initialized randomly 
for each experiment, but the bidders´ type keeps constant for 
all the GA execution, this is, they have the same preferences 
for the 10,000 auctions. The search for the best strategy in 
each environment was performed using populations of four 
bidders. The parameters used in the experiments are reported 
in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3 
PARAMETERS USED FOR THE EXPERIMENTS  
  Without dropout 
information 
GA Canonical (SimpleGA 
from GALib) 
N/A 
Population 1 Population 4 Individuals 
Encoding Vector of bits 4 bits 
Selection Roulette N/A 
Crossover Single point 100% 
Mutation Flip bit  [1..0.05]% 
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS   
In this section the outcome obtained by the GA strategy is 
analyzed. The experiments were run for the two 
environments described: decreasing and increasing marginal 
utilities, with fifteen items to be auctioned and four bidders. 
Revenues and efficiency of auctions as well as the bidders` 
behaviour and payoff have been studied. The revenues are 
measured as the monetary units that the seller gets after each 
auction. It has been compared the average actual revenue of 
each experiment with the one obtained if all bidders follow 
the sincere bidding strategy. An auction is considered to be 
efficient when it allocates the object to the bidder who 
values it the most ex post the auction. Therefore, for these 
experiments, efficiency is defined as the sum of the values 
of the fifteen units sold in an auction as a percentage of the 
sum the fifteen highest values in that auction. For the 
Ausubel auction and decreasing marginal utilities, efficiency 
is predicted to be 100%, as in equilibrium, this is, bidding 
sincerely, it ensures full efficiency [18]. Therefore the 
average actual efficiency per experiment is compared to 
100%. For the increasing marginal values environment, a 
theory model has not been developed, so there is no 
reference for the predicted values. Therefore, full efficiency 
is also assumed (100%) to do the comparison. Finally, the 
bidders´ payoff and bidding strategy is analyzed in each 
environment.  
A. Results with decreasing marginal utilities 
The first step to analyse the auction outcome with the GA 
and decreasing marginal utilities is to study the bidders´ 
behavior. To this end, the bidders´ strategies for the first 
2,700 auctions have been mapped in Figure 1, and bidding 
sincerely strategy is represented by one ( l
SBiq ). As the figure 
shows, bidders try all the possible strategies, mainly 
overbidding for the first iterations. Finally, as the 
logarithmic tendency line reports, bidders essentially bid 
sincerely (the 10,000 iterations have not been included in 
order to have a better understanding of the figure, but 
bidding sincerely continues being the stable strategy till the 
last auction). For these iterations, bidding sincerely is the 
strategy for the 76.07% auctions, being the ESS.  
With this performance the revenues and efficiency 
outcome of the auctions is reported in Table 4. These data 
are compared with the predicted ones; this is, with the 
outcome if all bidders were to bid sincerely.   
TABLE 4. 







sincere bidding (%) 100% 
Actual average 
revenue with the 
GA (units) 12,697 
Actual average 
efficiency with the 
GA (%) 98.8% 
Standard error of 
the mean 34.20 
Standard error of the 
mean 0.0002 
Difference 1,313   
% Difference -12% % Difference 1% 
% of iterations 
that the GA yields 
to the same 
revenue as sincere 
bidding 72.84% 
% of iterations that 
the GA yields to the 
same revenue as 
sincere bidding 76.13% 
Revenues are measured as the monetary units that the seller gets after 
each auction. Efficiency is defined as the sum of the values of the fifteen 
units sold in an auction as a percentage of the sum the fifteen highest values 
in that auction. The average of both values is compared with the results if all 
bidders do sincere bidding (sincere bidding). 
 
The actual average revenue with the GA is higher than the 
predicted one but this difference represents only the 12%. 
The GA aims is to improve the bidders payoff. Therefore, all 
the bidding strategies are tested. As a result, when the 
bidding strategy differs from truthful bidding, the bidders 
are worst off, and therefore, the sellers´ revenues are higher. 
72.84% of the auctions yield to the same revenue that would 
be obtained if all bidders did sincere bidding. The average 
efficiency level is also very close to the predicted one 
(98.8%) and 76.13% of the auctions yield to full efficiency. 
This difference is because the GA tries all the possible 
bidding strategies and because of the evolution and mutation 
effects. At the beginning all the strategies are settled 
randomly, and therefore correspond to bad strategies, and 






















Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 Bidder 4 Logaritmic tendency lyne 
 
Fig. 1.  Bidders´ strategy with decreasing marginal values for the first 
2,700 auctions. Each strategy is plot according to Table 2, column 3. 
2583




However, always new individuals are created with mutation 
operator. 
The GA revenues for the last 1,000 iterations are 
represented in Figure 2. These values are also compared 
with the predicted ones. The figure shows that the sincere 














The efficiency for the last 1,000 auctions of the 10,000 
iterations run with the GA is mapped in Figure 3. The 
efficiency level is below one (100%) but very close.  
 
Finally, the bidders´ payoff is another convenient way to 
study the participants´ behaviour. Table 5 includes the 
bidders´ payoff if they all bid sincerely and the 
percentage of iterations that the bidders´ strategy yield to 
the same payoff as bidding sincerely. The results reveal 
that bidders with the GA strategies are mainly getting the 
same payoff as with the sincere bidding strategy.  
TABLE 5 
BIDDERS´ PAYOFF WITH DECREASING MARGINAL VALUES 
 
Nº times payoff GA = Payoff sincere 
bidding 
Bidder 1 73.69% 
Bidder 2 73.60% 
Bidder 3 72.88% 
Bidder 4 74.00% 
Number of auctions or iterations that each bidder earns the same 
payoff as if all bidders do sincere bidding (sincere bidding). 
 
Furthermore Figure 4 presents the difference payoff 
obtained by each bidder in each auction respect to the one 
obtained if all participants bid sincerely, for the last 1,000 
auctions. As it shows bidders can either have higher and 
lower payoff but these situations are not stables. Deviations 
from the sincere bidding strategy can lead important losses 
for the bidders. No strategy overcomes truthful bidding for 
all bidders at the same time. Therefore, bidding sincerely, i. 
e. when the difference is equal to zero predominates across 
the iterations. 
 
The GA has been tested in 50 experiments and in all of 
them the sincere bidding strategy has been reached as the 
ESS. Reference [12] established that sincere bidding is a 
weakly dominant strategy in the auction with no bid 
information and weakly decreasing marginal values. The 
GA has reached this weakly dominant strategy for the 
auction as the ESS. 
B. Results with increasing marginal values 
In the environment with increasing marginal utilities, the 
same variables have been tested. The bidders´ bidding 
strategies for the first 1,000 iterations are represented in 
Figure 5. As it shows bidders try to maximize their fitness 
by over and underbidding. Nevertheless, the only stable 
strategy is to bid sincerely.  
The effect over revenues and efficiency is summarized in 
Table 6. The average revenues obtained with the GA are 
very close to those if all bidders were to bid sincerely in 
every round of each auction, the difference only represent a 
2%. Out of the 10,000 iterations, 75.12% yield to the same 
revenues as if all bidders do sincere bidding. As bidders are 
mainly bidding sincerely, the average efficiency level is also 


































































Dif bidder 1 Dif bidder 2 Dif bidder 3 Dif bidder 4
 
Fig. 4.  GA bidders´ payoff minus sincere bidding bidders´ payoff 
with decreasing marginal utilities for the last 1,000 auctions 
Fig. 3.  Efficiency per auction with decreasing marginal utilities for the 





















Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 Bidder 4 Logaritmic tendency lyne















GA Revenues SB Revenues
Fig. 2.  GA and sincere bidding (sincere bidding) Revenues per iteration 
with decreasing marginal utilities for the last 1,000 auctions 
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GA Revenues SB Revenues
Fig. 6.  GA and sincere bidding (sincere bidding) Revenues per 

















GA efficiency 100% efficiency
Fig. 7.  Efficiency per auction with increasing marginal utilities for the 
last 1,000 auctions 
of the iterations gave in an efficiency level of 100%. 
TABLE 6 






Efficiency with full 
efficiency (%) 100% 
Actual average 
revenue with the 
GA (units) 74,752 
Actual average 
efficiency with the GA 
(%) 92.9% 
Standard error of 
the mean 83.15 
Standard error of the 
mean 0.002 
Difference -1,907   
% Difference 2% % Difference 7% 
% of iterations that 
the GA yields to the 
same revenue as 
sincere bidding 75.12% 
% of iterations that the 
GA yields to the same 
revenue as sincere 
bidding 86.19% 
Revenues are measured as the monetary units that the seller gets after 
each auction. Efficiency is defined as the sum of the values of the fifteen 
units sold in an auction as a percentage of the sum the fifteen highest values 
in that auction. The average of both values is compared with the results if all 
bidders do sincere bidding. 
 
The revenues per auction for the last 1,000 iterations are 
represented in Figure 6. This figure just corroborates the 
intuition of Table 6. The GA strategy that dominates yields 













The efficiency analysis for the last 1,000 iterations is 
represented in Figure 7. Although the GA yields to some 
efficiency levels below 100%, those strategies are not stable. 









The bidders´ payoff is reported in Table 7. When bidders 
bid sincerely, those participants with the highest valuations 
are awarded the items. However, it is also possible for this 
strategy to earn negative payoff. With increasing marginal 
values, if one bidder does not clinch all the units demanded 
at the standing price, then his valuation can be lower than 
the total payment. In this circumstance he will have a 
negative payoff. Even so, the GA best strategy without 
dropout information is to bid sincerely. Bidders don’t have 
information during the auction to respond to their rival’s 
bids. As Table 7 shows, bidders are earning most of the 
times the same payoff as if they all bid sincerely. 
TABLE 7 
BIDDERS´ PAYOFF WITH INCREASING MARGINAL VALUES 
 Nº times payoff GA = Payoff sincere bidding 
Bidder 1 94.91% 
Bidder 2 84.18% 
Bidder 3 95.41% 
Bidder 4 75.07% 
Number of auctions or iterations that each bidder earns the same payoff 
as if all bidders do sincere bidding. 
The difference of the payment that the bidders have 
obtained following the GA strategies with respect to what 
they would have obtained bidding sincerely is mapped in 
Figure 8. As the figure reports the GA constantly search for 
new and better strategies. However, none but sincere 
bidding ends stable.  
 
The GA has been tested in 50 experiments within this 
environment. In all of experiments run bidding sincerely is 
the final ESS strategy. To determine that biding sincerely is 
an ESS for the Ausubel auction even when increasing 
marginal values are set up is a key finding. As there is no 
theory model developed for this assumption the predicted 
results were uncertain. Likewise, as bidders bid sincerely, 
the efficient allocation of the items remains. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This work is focused on a specific dynamic ascending 
multi-unit auction with implementation of Vickrey pricing, 
which is referred to as the Ausubel auction. The experiments 
have been carried out under an IPV framework and without 
drop out information. Besides, two environments have been 
considered according to the bidders´ preferences: weakly 
diminishing marginal values and weakly increasing marginal 
values.  
It has been developed a GA that can be successfully 






























































Dif bidder 1 Dif bidder 2 Dif bidder 3 Dif bidder 4
Fig. 8.  GA bidders´ payoff minus sincere bidding bidders´ payoff 
with increasing marginal utilities for the last 1,000 auctions 
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format. The GA aims to maximize each bidder’s fitness, 
measured as the actual payoff. To this end, the algorithm 
generates thirteen different bidding strategies or actions 
defined in terms of deviations from the sincere bidding 
strategy: overbidding, underbidding or bidding sincerely. 
The experiments were run for fifteen items to be auctioned 
and four bidders. Each experiment was run for 10,000 
iterations.  
With decreasing marginal utilities and no bid information, 
[12] established that sincere bidding is a weakly dominant 
strategy and an ex post perfect equilibrium. In the 50 
computational experiments developed the GA finds a 
strategy that finish finding the sincere bidding strategy as the 
ESS.  
The main finding of this work is to have reached an ESS 
for bidders with increasing marginal utilities, as no 
theoretical model has been developed yet with this 
preferences assumption. In the 50 experiments run the 
algorithm reaches sincere bidding as the ESS. This result 
ensures full efficiency in the allocation of the items.  
There are several directions in which the work presented 
could be extended. First of all, the GA results can be 
compared with a brute force algorithm testing all the search 
space (413). Besides, the information rule established can 
have important implications finding the ESS. Therefore, it 
could be interesting to analyse the auction outcome 
assuming that there is drop out information during the 
auctions, this is, bidders have full bid information. Another 
challenge could be to find the ESS when the bidders´ values 
are interdependent, this is, assuming common values. 
Additionally, the assessment of the sensitivity of the results 
to a wider range of combinations of number of bidders and 
items to be auctioned would also be of interest. 
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